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If one wishes to enlarge the ADR canon, the topic of ethics may seem an
unlikely place to start. Most books and textbooks on negotiation and ADR
discuss ethics, and scholars have published many articles dealing with both
negotiation and mediation ethics- What then, is so new about ADR ethics?
Why should we see it as having growth potential as a topic for discussion,
teaching, and research?
I break the topic of ADR ethics into two related parts: the ethics of exchange,
which deals with the moral and legal implications of bargaining, and the ethics
of assistance, which deals with the ethical issues that arise whenever a third
party intervenes in a dispute. In this short comment I defend the proposition
that both areas would profit from renewed attention. I argue that central
questions remain about the ethics of exchange, such as how to think about
honesty and fairness in the context of bargaining, whether negotiators have
any ethical obligation to cooperate rather than compete, and how best to
understand a lawyer's role in negotiation. Likewise, the ethics of third-party
assistance could be further developed. Although much excellent work has
been done in this area (for example, by others participating in this sympo-
sium), more thinking is needed about what ethical obligations a mediator or
arbitrator takes on, about how these roles change in various contexts, and
about how best to regulate the ethics of the assisting professions.
The Ethics of Exchange
Bargaining is morally complicated. Whenever negotiators interact, there is
opportunity for deception and manipulation, evasion and exploitation. Given
that bargaining fuels our economy and our polity, governs our daily affairs,
and structures our relations, insight into the moral and ethical dimensions of
bargaining is fundamentally important.
What are these moral and ethical dimensions? There are many rich and
varied questions to be answered. How should bargainers think about the
moral aspects of their actions? If there are moral obligations to be honest or
fair during negotiation, how can we best describe or discern those obligations?
Scott R. Peppet <scott.peppet@colorado.edu> is an associate professor of law at the University of
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1. For an excellent recent summary of this literature, seejonathan R. Cohen, When People Are
the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739, 741 n.3 (2001).
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What are they based on, where do they come from, and what are their
boundaries? If these moral concerns are formalized in ethics codes or legal
rules, what should those rules say? Should they set a floor of minimally
acceptable ethical behavior, or describe an aspiration or ceiling? How can
such ethical obligations be monitored or enforced? Should they vary by
context, and if so, how? And what is a lawyer's role in all of this? Do these
various moral or ethical restraints apply to an attorney's negotiations in the
same way that they might apply to a client's?
Thankfully, my task here is to raise such questions, not answer them. More
than that, my goal is to focus our research agenda on what I consider to be
the most interesting or underdeveloped topics in negotiation ethics. There
are four.
First, how should we think about honesty and fairness in negotiation?
These are the two most difficult moral problems bargainers face. They raise all
sorts of questions. Can I lie? If so, why is such deception justified in the
bargaining context when it might not be elsewhere? If not, how far can I go in
bluffing or puffing without crossing the line into unacceptable lies? Even if I
don't lie, when may I keep silent? What am I required to disclose, and why?
Assuming I have been honest, can I take advantage of another negotiator or
accept a deal that is grossly in my favor? What does fairness require of me
in bargaining? Far more work has been done on the issues of honesty
and disclosure than on the problem of fairness, but both areas remain ripe
for discussion.
Second, is there a duty to cooperate in bargaining? Negotiation scholars
have long described the basic tension between problem-solving, collaborative,
or cooperative strategies and more adversarial, "hard," or competitive strate-
gies.2 In general we have discussed this choice as a pragmatic one. On the one
hand, if you are a problem solver, you may be able to expand the pie by
coming up with value-creating trades that satisfy one or both parties' interests.
You may also be able to build or preserve your relationship with the other side,
which may have long-term benefits. On the other hand, if you adopt a more
competitive strategy, you may be able to exploit the other side, particularly if
the other side is unsophisticated, inept, or overly trusting. Although such an
approach may forgo some opportunities to expand the pie, the lion's share of
a small pie may be better for you than a more equitable division of a larger
one. Particularly if the other side has adopted a collaborative strategy, you may
be tempted to try to exploit them rather than reciprocate.
These pragmatic considerations are no doubt important. Equally interest-
ing, however, is whether a negotiator-principal or agent-has any moral
obligation to try to collaborate or expand the pie. This is analogous, of course,
to the infamous prisoner's dilemma (PD).' As many negotiation scholars have
2. See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and
Disputes 12-13 n.1 (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
3. I will assume familiarity with the prisoner's dilemma. For background on this most famous of
games, see Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1994);
William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (New York, 1992).
Journal of Legal Education
noted,4 the choice of a collaborative or competitive strategy is quite similar to
the choice of whether to cooperate or defect in a PD game. For brevity's sake,
therefore, I will focus here on whether there is any duty to cooperate in a
prisoner's dilemma.
Much recent moral theory has been done on this topic, although negotation
scholars seem largely unaware that their field has become of great interest to
philosophy departments. Here I will mention only one strain of such work.
David Gauthier, a Canadian philosopher, has forcefully argued for more than
two decades that there are indeed moral implications to the prisoner's di-
lemlna.5 He reaches the rather starding conclusion-at least from the per-
spective of most economists and game theorists-that a moral person will at
times cooperate rather than defect, even in a one-shot PD.
Gauthier reasons as follows. He begins from the common conclusion that
rational, self-interested actors will defect in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. He
recognizes that this is an equilibrium solution to the game. He then focuses on
the question of how a self-interested actor in this situation will reason about
her plight. Ultimately, Gauthier argues that rational, self-interested actors-
whom he calls straightforward maximizers (SMs)-will make a choice. They
will choose to stop being SMs, and instead to become constrained maximizers
(CMs). A CM differs from an SM in an important way: whereas an SM will
cheat if given the opportunity, a CM will sometimes sacrifice short-term self-
interest to a longer-term commitment to keep promises and agreements. In
other words, a CM will give up short-term gains for long-term gains. Why?
Because a CM has figured out that there are certain sorts of gains that come
from cooperation. And that you cannot cooperate to exploit those gains if you
are always looking over your shoulder for fear that your collaborators are
trying to exploit you.
A CM thus pulls himself out of the prisoner's dilemma--deciding to start
being a different kind of person, or a person with a different kind of disposi-
tion. This is not just a temporary mood change. Instead, Gauthier imagines
that an SM can choose among basic dispositions-and that once that change
is made and the SM is a CM, the CM will no longer succumb to the short-term
temptation to defect. The CM has internalized a moral code that constrains
self-interest in order to be able to cooperate.
This is a complex argument, and Gauthier's work has been much discussed,
criticized,6 and improved upon by others.7 I am not prepared to attack or
4. See, e.g., David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for
Cooperation and Competitive Gain 30 (New York, 1986) (characterizing as the "negotiator's
dilemma" the "central, inescapable tension between cooperative moves to create valuejointly
and competitive moves to gain individual advantage").
5. See generally Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason (Ithaca, 1990); Morals by Agree-
ment (New York, 1986).
6. Some have attacked Gauthier's contractarianism as ignoring the fact that any social contract
inevitably has racial, economic, and other biases-that, in short, it can be a contract of the
elite to maintain itself. See Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, 1997); Carole Pateman,
The Sexual Contract (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
7. See, e.g., Paul Voice, Morality and Agreement: A Defense of Moral Contractarianism (New
York, 2002).
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defend it at this point. But it is worth noting the important connections that
can be drawn between the work of negotiation and ADR scholars interested in
the ethics of exchange and those already working on such problems in the
more traditional philosophical disciplines. Gauthier's work-and much
contractarian and contractualist moral theory-suggests that there are moral
dimensions to the negotiator's choice of whether to cooperate or compete. If
one is willing to take this stand, it has obvious and important consequences for
our understanding of ADR ethics.
A third area ripe for continued consideration is the lawyer's role in negotia-
tions. Many ADR scholars, myself included, have urged lawyers to adopt more
problem-solving or collaborative strategies in order to best meet their clients'
interests. Many lawyers, however, remain skeptical. At its most extreme, this
skepticism leads lawyers to reject any bargaining strategy that does not seek to
squeeze every last dollar from one's opponent. Problem solving may seem too
soft to such lawyers, or too likely to amount to compromise that could have
been avoided through a more adversarial approach. Even in its less extreme
incarnation, however, this skepticism raises serious doubts for lawyers. How,
they ask, are we to reconcile a desire to problem-solve with a competing desire
to protect our clients from exploitation? Even if I want to collaborate, I can not
(or should not) because it will put my client in jeopardy.
This role conflict is easily dismissed, minimized, or overlooked, but it is not
as easily resolved. Many scholars, again myself included, have made the
empirical assertion that although adopting a problem-solving or collaborative
orientation may sacrifice some gains for some clients some of the time, overall
it will produce better outcomes.9 (Generally such scholars also add that with
sufficient understanding of defensive tactics, a problem-solving attorney can
minimize the negative consequences of trying to collaborate.) But there is
little empirical testing of this hypothesis, and it may be wrong. Lawyers who
adopt a problem-solving stance may put their clients' interests in peril more
than we realize, particularly given that learning new strategies and techniques
takes time. As a lawyer experiments with collaborative approaches, he may
implement them incompletely or lack the skill to simultaneously defend
himself. In truth, we know little about the developmental path that attorneys
take as they implement these approaches, and less about the consequences
for clients.
At a more fundamental level, ADR scholars need to reexamine our assump-
tions about the short- and long-term tradeoffs that must be made when an
individual lawyer and/or client seeks to adopt a collaborative approach to
bargaining. Many of us seem to believe-perhaps due to an overly optimistic
reading of Robert Axelrod's famous The Evolution of Cooperation -that nice
8. For an excellent recent collection of essays on the subject, see Contractarianism/
Contractualism, ed. Stephen Darwall (New York, 2003). See also Contractarianism and
Rational Choice, ed. Peter Vallentyne (Cambridge, 1991). For an intriguing review and
critique (of many things, including Gauthier), see Ken Binmore, Playing Fair: Game Theory
and the Social Contract (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
9. See Mnookin et al., supra note 2, at 322.
10. NewYork, 1984.
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collaborative strategies analogous to tit-for-tat will over time come to domi-
nate in PD-type situations. The accepted wisdom about Axelrod's tournament
has made it reasonably comfortable for ADR scholars to assume that collabo-
rators will do better over time than hard bargainers, and thus to assume away
the lawyer's role conflict described above.
Such assumptions are misleading, however. Without digressing into ex-
tended game theoretics, it is not at all clear that tit-for-tat dominates other
strategies, or, by analogy, that collaboration will over time do better than hard
bargaining. Other strategies fare reasonably well, and much depends on the
initial distribution of strategies across a population.11 Assuming that most
lawyers use adversarial strategies-or at least believe that most other lawyers use
such strategies-it may be very difficult for collaborative or problem-solving
approaches to take hold. At the very least, the profession could profit front
additional guidance on how to reconcile the lawyer's possible desire to col-
laborate with the lawyer's duties to her client.
Finally, and most broadly, there is work to be done on how conflict and
conflict resolution contribute to moral development. It is increasingly clear to
me that conflict-and the choices one makes in conflict-can serve as a
millstone under which to grind our moral sensibilities.12 In particular, I am
curious about the moral dimensions of listening and empathy-about what is
required truly to hear and attend to another person despite disagreement.
Similarly, I am curious about how learning to manage interpersonal conflict
both depends upon and furthers moral growth. This aspect of the ethics of
exchange may be particularly important for lawyers, many of whom despair at
the state of their profession and the adversarial flavor of most legal negotia-
tion. As the legal profession struggles to find moral footing for its members,
conflict and conflict resolution may paradoxically provide some refuge.
13
The Ethics of Assistance
Just as negotiation or exchange has moral consequence, so does conflict
intervention. Whenever a third party steps between two disputants, she risks
that her attempt to assist will be mistaken for a desire to control or an effort to
serve her own ends. The interventionist must manage these perceptions and
the ever-present possibility that they are accurate-that, indeed, her motives
or means are not as pure as we might hope.
A great deal has been written about the ethics of ADR, particularly the
ethics of mediation and arbitration. 4 Nevertheless, a great deal more remains
to be done. I will focus on three areas ripe for continued discussion.
11. For an interesting discussion of Axelrod's experiments and ensuing critique, see Binmore,
supra note 8, at 194-203.
12. See Scott Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate: An Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in
Bargaining, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 83 (2002).
13. See, e.g.,John R. Van Winkle, Mediation: A Path Back for the Lost Lawyer (Chicago, 2001).
14. See generally Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth, Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive
Guide (Washington, 2002).
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First, many questions remain about the ethics of the mediator's (or
arbitrator's) role. In the last two decades we have focused primarily on the
debate about what mediation is and whether certain approaches to media-
tion-particularly evaluative approaches-are mediation or should be prac-
ticed. The facilitative-evaluative-transformative debate continues. At the same
time, however, ADR scholars and practitioners have begun to discuss many
other interesting ethical issues related to the mediator's role. What is neutral-
ity, and how does it change from context to context?"5 How much control
should parties have over the structure of a mediation or the mediator's role?
Should, for example, parties be permitted to sacrifice certain heralded val-
ues-such as neutrality-by enlisting a mediator to work under a contingent
fee agreement that conditions the mediator's payment on whether the case
settles during mediation? 6 How transparent should a mediator be about her
perceptions of the parties and of the likelihood of settlement?17 Can a media-
tor deceive the disputing parties or distort information if such distortion
might increase the odds of concluding a deal? 8 Each of these issues goes to
the ethics of the mediator's role, and each is an example of the importance of
continued work in this area.
Second, interest is growing in the ethical issues raised by the growing use of
ADR processes in different contexts and institutional settings. As mediation
becomes embedded in ombuds offices, etc., it raises questions about how
traditional conceptions of confidentiality and neutrality apply in these set-
tings. Similarly, mediation and conflict-resolution practitioners seem increas-
15. See Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence,
and Transformative Process, 14 Mediation Q. 215, 217 (1997). The best writings in this area
are Sarah Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Media-
tion, 16 Law & Soc. Inquiry 35 (1991);Judith L. Maute, Public Values and PrivateJustice: A
Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 503 (1991); Sydney E. Bernard et al.,
The Neutral Mediator Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation, 4 Mediation Q. 61, 66 (1984).
For critique of the classical conception of neutrality, see David Dyck, The Mediator as
Nonviolent Advocate: Revisiting the Question of Mediator Neutrality, 18 Mediation Q. 129,
139 (2000); Matthew A. Levitt, Kilometer 101: Oasis or Mirage? An Analysis of Third-Party
Self-Interest in International Mediation, 15 Mediation Q. 155, 155 (1997); Christopher
Honeyman, Bias and Mediators' Ethics, in Negotiation Theory and Practice, eds. William
Breslin &Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 429, 430-31 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). See also ConnieJ. A. Beck
& Bruce D. Sales, Family Mediation: Facts, Myths and Future Prospects 41, 42, 47 (Washing-
ton, 2001); Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 Negot.J. 349, 351 (1993).
For critique that overly formal conceptions of neutrality restrict mediators from correcting
power imbalances, see Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Nega-
tive Cultural Myths, 1995J. Disp. Resol. 55, 80; Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 515 (1992). See also Russell Engler, And
Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges,
Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987, 1990 (1999);Judith L. Maute, Mediator
Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990.J. Disp. Resol. 347, 358.
16. See Scott Pepper, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Contingent
Fee Mediation, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 227 (2003).
17. See Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators Make
Their Conduct More Transparent? 13 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1997).
18. Brown and Ayres raise the point that deception is in some ways necessary to create value. See
Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 Va. L. Rev. 323,
339-40 (1994). See also Michael Moffitt, Will This Case Settle? An Exploration of Mediators'
Predictions, 16 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 39 (2000).
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ingly to be crossing over into the worlds of organizational development,
change management, and organizational psychology. My own practice, for
example, has increasingly been within the corporate context, whether I am
working on intrateam or intraorganizational conflicts. There is much work to
be done connecting these different disciplines. Likewise, there is much work
to be done reconsidering the ethics of assistance in these new contexts.
Finally, there remain ethical issues related to the institutionalization of
ADR and the growth of the mediation and arbitration professions as profes-
sions. We remain a decentralized and relatively unorganized profession. Eth-
ics codes abound, 9 but many mediators practice in ignorance of their rel-
evance. Few states have centralized licensing or review processes. Statutory
guidance on issues such as confidentiality and immunity varies tremendously
by jurisdiction. (Although the new Uniform Mediation Act may bring some
consistency, it is limited in scope and may not enjoy uniform adoption.)
Lawyers face particular complications as they blend their role as legal advocate
with the role of mediator, but the American Bar Association's new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct offer little assistance. The rules do include a
new Model Rule 2.4 that deals with lawyers serving as third-party neutrals, but
it is very limited in scope. In short, we have a long way to go before the
mediation community achieves the sort of coherence, internal regulation,
and structure that will make it a true profession.
Both the ethics of exchange and the ethics of assistance continue to
provoke discussion, debate, and research. Each raises difficult moral ques-
tions, such as when one can lie or what it means to be neutral when interven-
ing between disputing parties. Each also raises difficult professional ethics
questions, such as how best to reconcile one's competing roles as lawyer,
negotiator, or mediator, or how the mediation profession can best self-regu-
late. Despite several decades of advances in our understanding of ADR, we still
have a great deal more to do.
19. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators are the best-known. The Model Standards
are available at 1995J. Disp. Resol. 1 22-28. They are also reprinted in Bernard & Garth, supra
note 14, at 257-62. Many state and federal courts have also adopted codes of conduct for
mediators. See Peppet, supra note 16.
